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Nietzsche on Loneliness, Self-Transformation,
and the Eternal Recurrence
Justin REMHOF | OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY

Abstract: Nietzsche’s presentation of the eternal recurrence in Gay Science 341 is
often viewed as a practical thought experiment meant to radically transform us.
But exactly why and how we are supposed to be transformed is not clear. I contend that addressing these issues requires taking a close look at the psychological setting of the passage. The eternal recurrence is presented in our “loneliest
loneliness.” I argue that facing the eternal recurrence from a state of profound
loneliness both motivates self-transformation and contributes toward helping
us succeed at that project.
Keywords: loneliness, eternal recurrence, self-transformation, morality, empiri
cal psychology

What Cara would forget is that talking to her sister, Cara didn’t feel
any of those things. That for a time she only felt lonely: a loneliness
so physical it was part of her, a second tongue that shaped her
every word, a muscle so strong and necessary she was certain it had
always been there.
—Kevin Clouther, “Puritan Hotel, Boston”

Nietzsche’s presentation of the eternal recurrence in GS 341 is often viewed
as a practical thought experiment aimed at testing the worth of a life, rather
than a metaphysical view about the way the world is.1 The experiment concerns a “demon” who tells us “this life as you now live it and have lived it
you will have to live once again and innumerable times again” (GS 341).2
This thought is supposed to radically transform us. Nietzsche states, “If this
thought gained power over you, as you are it would transform and possibly
crush you” (GS 341).3 And, at the end of the passage, he asks, “how well
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disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?”
(GS 341). But exactly why and how we are supposed to be transformed is
not clear. I contend that addressing these issues requires taking a close look
at something that has received very little attention in the literature: the fact
that the demon presents the eternal recurrence in our “loneliest loneliness
[einsamste Einsamkeit].”4 In this article, I aim to explain why and how
Nietzsche thinks facing the eternal recurrence in a psychological state of
our deepest loneliness is supposed to be transformative.
Here is the plan. I begin by explaining why “Einsamkeit” should be translated as “loneliness” and offering a basic definition of loneliness. Afterward
I describe the reaction that Nietzsche anticipates our having when we imagine the eternal recurrence in a state of severe loneliness: out of horror, we
want to reject the demon’s suggestion. But loneliness, I argue, motivates
its own overcoming, like hunger or thirst. I then point to contemporary
empirical psychological research to suggest that loneliness both motivates
Nietzschean self-transformation and supplies crucial conditions that help
enable success. Such success empowers us to affirm the eternal recurrence.
I finish by responding to objections, explaining an important virtue of my
account, and showing that other interpretations of the psychological setting
of the test fail to secure the motivation to undergo and achieve Nietzschean
self-transformation.
Let us begin. My reading of the eternal recurrence in GS 341 turns on
translating “Einsamkeit” as “loneliness.” But “Einsamkeit” could also be
rendered as “solitude,” in which case “einsamste Einsamkeit” would be
“most solitary solitude.”5 How should we pick a translation? We should
prefer whatever best fits Nietzsche’s aims. “Loneliness” best satisfies the
aim of GS 341, which is to provoke self-transformation. Nietzsche regards
solitude as a virtue that indicates confident self-reliance. Those who are
“higher” and “greater,” he says, including “free spirits” and “philosophers of
the future,” are “friends of solitude” (BGE 44; see also EH P 3). Loneliness
indicates something else entirely. Nietzsche connects loneliness with
“shades of distress,” “weariness,” and “gloominess” (BGE 26; see also Z III:
“The Wanderer”). Loneliness involves vulnerability. We are vulnerable
when lonely because we feel that something about our lives is missing or
unfulfilled. Specifically, we are precluded from making certain connections
that we long to establish, connections that concern who we take ourselves
to be.6 Such feelings can push us to transform our lives. Indeed, Nietzsche
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tends to believe that the best forms of change come from suffering.7
Confident self-reliance seems to have no such motivational force. When
translating “Einsamkeit” in GS 341, then, we have reason to prefer “loneliness” over “solitude,” and this translation choice will gain further support
as we continue.8
What does “loneliness” mean? Ordinarily, it signifies the pain of feeling
alone. Depending on the individual and circumstance, of course, loneliness can mean much more. For instance, it can indicate a painful sense of
longing or loss of support. Loneliness could point to something fleeting,
maybe even momentarily welcomed, or it could signify an enduring sense
of desolation, perhaps even inconsolable loss. Despite such nuances, understanding loneliness merely as the pain of feeling alone will suffice for the
argument I develop below.9 Importantly, by linking loneliness with “shades
of distress,” “weariness,” and “gloominess” (BGE 26), Nietzsche seems to
accept the commonsense definition. For instance, in the 1886 preface to
HH he writes, “Loneliness [Einsamkeit] encircles and embraces him [the
free spirit], ever more threatening, suffocating, heart-tightening, that terrible goddess and mater saeva cupidinum” (HH P 3).10 The free spirit is
struck with feeling alone, which is characterized as “threatening,” “suffocating,” and “heart-tightening.” All of these refer to states of pain. Indeed,
when Zarathustra approaches his “ultimate loneliness,” he cries that he
must descend “deeper into pain than I ever descended, down to its blackest
flood” (Z III: “The Wanderer”). For Nietzsche, loneliness signifies a painful
psychological state caused by feeling alone.
Now the big question: Why does the demon offer the eternal recurrence to us when we are in our loneliest loneliness? The answer, I think,
is not pretty: Nietzsche first wants us to fail the test—to recoil and “curse
the demon” (GS 341). It should be obvious that facing the thought that our
lives will recur “again and again” (GS 341) from a state of severe loneliness
significantly amplifies the likelihood of eliciting a negative response. We are
not presented the eternal recurrence in just any state of loneliness. If that
were the case, we could imagine some individuals not being gripped by the
demon’s suggestion. Some might enjoy moments of loneliness, for instance,
and thus the aversive effect of loneliness might be minimal. Instead, we are
presented with the eternal recurrence in a very particular moment of our
lives: our loneliest loneliness.
Loneliness is nearly always painful. And our loneliest loneliness
must certainly be painful. Not only this, but profound loneliness is often
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associated with feelings of alienation, emptiness, unimportance, and
worthlessness—perhaps even shame, guilt, and regret.11 The demon suggests that we imagine bearing the worst pain of feeling alone not just once,
but “innumerable times again” (GS 341). Entertaining this thought, it seems
to me, explains why Nietzsche calls the eternal recurrence the “heaviest
weight” (GS 341). No one wants to imagine feeling his or her deepest, darkest loneliness again and again indefinitely. Genuinely embracing such a
thought is simply crushing.
The fact that Nietzsche appears to want us to fail the test is supported
by his understanding of our affective engagement with the world. R. Lanier
Anderson helpfully explains that for Nietzsche affects involve a “stimulus object,” or an object that activates an affect, and a “default behavioral
response,” or a typical behavior caused by a particular affect.12 Our hearing
the demon deliver the thought of eternal recurrence is a striking stimulus
object. What affective orientation does it activate? Given that we consider
the test from a superlative state of loneliness, the test aims to produce the
highest possible degree of the pain of feeling alone. This feeling would be
immensely hard. And reviewing the entirety of our lives from such a state
would likely highlight other times we were wrought with intensely negative feelings of isolation. Being in any maximally affective state should render us sensitive to similar states. If I were to imagine reliving my life again
and again from a state of being enveloped in some extremely triumphant
achievement, for instance, my attention would likely be drawn to similar
feelings of success. Thinking about reliving our most extreme loneliness
over and over again should therefore draw our attention to reliving other
forms of painful isolation. Nietzsche asks, “Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus?”
(GS 341). Absolutely. Rejecting the test certainly appears to be the behavioral response Nietzsche expects us to have. But, I suggest, only initially.
The experiment is introduced in our loneliest loneliness because imagining our lives eternally recurring from that perspective should move
us to overcome our loneliness after first cursing the demon. The painful
thought of unending loneliness should push us to face the challenge of self-
transformation. This is the behavioral response Nietzsche wants to provoke.
He wants us to understand our psychological distress so that we transform
ourselves. “Lonely one [Einsamer],” he says, “you are going the way to yourself,” but, “You must wish to consume yourself in your own flame: how could
you wish to become new unless you had first become ashes!” (Z I: “On the
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Way of the Creator”). Zarathustra proclaims that his “ultimate loneliness”
involves going “down deeper than ever I descended—deeper into pain than
I ever descended,” and “It is out of the deepest depth that the highest must
come to its height” (Z III: “The Wanderer”).13 Extreme loneliness enables
us to embrace the eternal recurrence in the right spirit and work toward
self-development.
One might worry that feeling deeply lonely is actually debilitating.
Indeed, psychological studies have suggested that over time loneliness predicts increases of depressive symptomatology,14 and people who believe
they face a future of social isolation tend to care about themselves less and
less.15 But it has also been shown that loneliness signals to us that certain
connections we strongly desire to forge require maintenance,16 and the
drive to repair broken connections oftentimes outweighs debilitating inaction.17 Much could depend on our attitude toward being lonely, but loneliness appears to be a typically aversive psychological state that stimulates us
to take action, specifically action that safeguards against feeling lonely. In
this sense, loneliness can be a strong motivator.
Of course, many aversive psychological states, such as terror or hopelessness, can be motivating. However, I suggest that loneliness not only
motivates self-transformation, but also puts us into a frame of mind to succeed at the task. The same cannot be said about other aversive psychological states, like terror or hopelessness. In fact, such states are often far too
incapacitating to generate self-development, let alone enable success. The
right kind of motivation is a first, crucial step, but motivation could come
to nothing without a chance to succeed.
How do we develop a positive behavioral response to the eternal
recurrence from a state of profound loneliness? If we take the test seriously as Nietzsche presents it, the test will not allow positive responses
that concern sheer fantasy and otherworldly religion. Flights into fantasy, such as daydreams, involve voluntary creations of the imagination
aimed at providing pleasure, which can help many avoid the pain of loneliness. But, according to Nietzsche, the eternal recurrence pertains to
“this life as you now live it and have lived it” (GS 341), not some life we
do not live but would like to live. The test also blocks escape by way of
religion. Religions such as Christianity can provide the promise of lasting happiness and offer eternal companionship.18 But the eternal recurrence nullifies such consolation, since by hypothesis the test requires that
we affirm or reject life only by assessing this world, where there is no
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lasting fulfillment and where we experience extreme distress. We need a
response to loneliness that addresses these problems.19
I suggest that if we focus exclusively on being better disposed toward
ourselves and this world, as Nietzsche says, then loneliness can provide
conditions for what he would consider a successful response to the eternal recurrence. I want to point out three such conditions. These conditions are not meant to secure any necessary causal links between loneliness
and self-transformation. For Nietzsche, nothing guarantees successful
self-development. My argument is simply that loneliness presents a unique
opportunity for such success. This should help explain the psychological
setting of the eternal recurrence in GS 341.
The first condition that loneliness supplies for what Nietzsche would
consider a successful response to the eternal recurrence is a feeling of being
disconnected from one’s social environment, including intimate attachments, friends, family, and collective group identities. Feeling socially disconnected, according to Nietzsche, enables us to gain a unique perspective
on social values. It allows us to take a critical stance on standardly recognized
values, perhaps even question the value of those values. The causality will
sometimes go in the other direction, such that being critical of social values
leads to loneliness. And perhaps one’s loneliest loneliness follows from critically engaging such values. Whatever the cause of loneliness, the point is
that feeling personally isolated can indicate that one’s values are incompatible with values commonly upheld and regulated by social relations. Social
engagements often require acting in accordance with, or even supporting,
values not fully our own, such that we feel out of place in regard to such values. Moreover, values that contribute to maintaining a harmonious social
life are typically perceived to enjoy greater value than values endorsed by
individuals regardless of social acceptance or utility. Loneliness can reveal
the tension between values that we might authentically endorse and values
that we might otherwise critically question or even reject. Loneliness can
therefore provide significant insight into the values that we might want to
embrace in order to become who we most desire to be.20
Feeling disconnected from the values that predominantly govern social
life is fundamental for Nietzschean self-transformation. Importantly, such
values are often closely associated with traditional moral systems. Nietzsche
notes, “To endure the idea of the recurrence one needs: freedom from morality” (KSA 11:26[283], p. 224).21 Freedom from morality, at the very least,
requires breaking from unreflective commitment to dominant structures of
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valuation. Nietzsche often points out that this break is typically motivated
by a new understanding of existing value systems, specifically the revelation
that traditional moral codes promote values that benefit the social order
by downplaying individuality. “Morality,” he remarks, “is herd-instinct in
the individual” (GS 116). Feelings of loneliness, which can highlight the
estrangement between one’s own values and those that govern social life,
can help make possible this recognition. Some individuals will find this recognition difficult to bear, of course, but finding the strength to embrace this
disconnect has great positive potential. Loneliness can show us that we are
in some important sense free from the grip of value systems that are disadvantageous to individual development.
The second feature of loneliness that can contribute to passing the eternal recurrence test is that lonely individuals actively distrust their social
environment. Psychological studies have indicated that loneliness strongly
increases attention to, and motivation to avoid, what are perceived to be the
negative features of social life.22 Loneliness activates a heightened sensitivity to social dangers, which results from feeling uncertain about confiding
in, depending on, or trusting others. On Nietzsche’s account, immersion
into social life can be dangerous in the sense that social entanglements
often result in the kinds of dependencies and blind trusts that limit our
capacity and ability to develop and express unique values. We therefore
need to protect our self-development from being undermined by our social
existence. Loneliness contributes to developing the psychological disposition that enables such protection.
This feature of loneliness plays an important role in the “lion” stage of
Nietzsche’s view of self-transformation, which is described in Zarathustra’s
“On the Three Metamorphoses.”23 In the “loneliest [einsamsten] desert,”
Nietzsche says, the lion emerges to “conquer his freedom” and “be master
in his own desert.” Freedom and mastery require rejecting the dragon’s
“Thou Shalt” and affirming “I will.” The dragon clearly represents traditional morality. According to Nietzsche, the lion “renounces” trust in, and
dependence on, traditional moral values, which results in the “creation
of freedom for oneself for new creation.” In the loneliest desert, then, the
lion creates better opportunities to gain authentic values, and this process relies on increased attention to features of social life that would damage self-development.24 Accordingly, Nietzsche notices that those who
support traditional moral systems, especially those who consider themselves “good” and “just” from the perspective of traditional morality, find
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loneliness threatening. He writes, “[The good and the just] like to crucify
those who invent their own virtue for themselves—they hate the lonely
one” (Z I: “On the Way of the Creator”). Loneliness can arouse insight into
how social life leads to the decline of individual good, which threatens
social harmony.25
The third condition associated with loneliness that helps individuals
affirm the eternal recurrence is that loneliness motivates self-interestedness.
Although it seems that loneliness would induce us immediately to seek
out company, rather than first caring for ourselves, research suggests the
reverse.26 And, given the two conditions described above, this makes sense.
We turn inward and attend to our own interests because loneliness not only
involves feelings of separation, but also mistrust. When we feel our trust in
social ties eroding, we tend to attempt repair from the inside out.
Importantly, Nietzsche thinks self-interestedness grounds self-transformation. His criticism of compassion (Mitleid) in GS makes the point
clear. He asks, “Is it good for you to be above all else compassionate persons?” (GS 338). The answer is “no.” The demands of reducing suffering disrupt self-development—“losing myself from my path” (GS 338). “Our own
way,” Nietzsche says, “is so hard and demanding and so far from love and
gratitude of others that we are by no means reluctant to escape from it, from
it and our ownmost conscience—and take refuge in the conscience of others” (GS 338). Loneliness can leave us feeling detached from the “love and
gratitude of others,” but rather than overcome loneliness by seeking care by
others, or taking “refuge in the conscience of others,” we must first care for
ourselves. It might be hard to reject such refuge, but accepting the feeling
that others have failed us can strengthen our resolve to focus on expressing
our “ownmost conscience.” Loneliness moves us to attend to ourselves, at
least first and foremost, which is imperative for self-development.
Let me summarize the account so far. I have argued that imagining the eternal recurrence in a state of our loneliest loneliness provokes
self-

transformation because feeling disconnected from social life and
distrustful toward common social connections moves us to seek out and
embrace values that are truly our own. Nietzsche initiates the test when we
are in an extreme state of isolation because he understands that our feelings of separation can inspire authenticity. But passing the test is clearly not
easy. Nietzschean self-transformation is incredibly difficult. However, by
having a proper understanding of the psychological setting of the test, we
can begin to understand what enables us to overcome the hurdles we face.
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Before moving on, I want to be clear that none of what I have said entails
that, on Nietzsche’s account, loneliness reveals that we are nonsocial, or
that Nietzschean self-development is a nonsocial project. Loneliness is not
some ontological state of existing alone—it is the feeling of being alone, a
feeling that transforms our understanding of social life. Our social existence is not something that can be rejected altogether. Nietzsche writes,
for example, “These people who have fled inward for their freedom also
have to live outwardly, become visible, let themselves be seen; they are
united with mankind through countless ties of blood, residence, education,
fatherland, chance, [and] the importunity of others” (SE 3, p. 139). Rejecting
traditional values does not imply rejecting social values across the board,
and endorsing authentic values does not imply endorsing nonsocial values.
Nietzschean self-development does emphasize the individual, but there is
no freeing the individual from social existence. Self-transformation helps
us forge a better understanding of ourselves, which includes a better understanding of how we most want to connect to others, or how we might be
authentic while maintaining our social connections.27
Now consider some objections. First, one might argue that it is inappropriate to appeal to the psychological studies that I have mentioned. Those
studies draw general conclusions about ordinary individuals, whereas
Nietzsche seems concerned only with higher individuals. It seems that the
studies are irrelevant to Nietzsche’s aims, and thus do no important work
here.
My response is twofold. First, while Nietzsche certainly does focus on
the importance of higher individuals, he also thinks everyone can and
should attempt self-transformation. In an aphorism titled “Traffic with
one’s higher self,” for instance, he says, “Everyone has his good days when
he discovers his higher self; and true humanity demands that everyone be
evaluated only in the light of this condition” (HH 624). Everyone has some
relation to his or her higher self, and genuine humanity should be judged in
terms of discovering that self. In another passage, he writes, “There is clearly
no trick that enables us to turn a poor virtue into a rich and overflowing
one, but we can surely reinterpret its poverty into a necessity, so that its
sight no longer offends us and we no longer make reproachful faces at fate
on its account” (GS 17). I see no reason to think that Nietzsche intends to
limit the scope of this advice only to a select few. Indeed, from UM to EH,
Nietzsche consistently provides advice for how ordinary folk might transform themselves. Of course, such passages are usually not very provocative,
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and maybe that is why they are overlooked. But they are—undeniably—
everywhere.28 Nietzsche’s famous proclamation “You should become who
you are” (GS 270) is perfectly general. “The Three Metamorphoses” pertains to all agents. And anyone can feel “the heaviest weight,” the eternal
recurrence.
But—and this is second part of my response—not everyone can succeed in self-transformation, and Nietzsche thinks higher individuals have
a better chance at success. He famously proclaims, “To ‘give style’ to one’s
character—a great and rare art! It is practiced by those who survey all the
strengths and weaknesses that their nature has to offer and then fit them
into an artistic plan until each appears as art and reason and even weaknesses delight the eye” (GS 290). Notice the universal scope: we can all give
“style” to our characters. But the project requires “long practice and daily
work,” and Nietzsche reports that “it will be the strong and domineering
natures who experience their most exquisite pleasure under such coercion,”
whereas “it is the weak characters with no power over themselves who
hate the constraint of style” (GS 290). Weak-natured individuals certainly
have a chance at successful self-transformation, but Nietzsche’s description of the profound difference in affective responses between weak- and
strong-natured individuals suggests that the latter have a better success rate.
It is then likely that those who are able to affirm the eternal recurrence are
those strong enough to overcome their loneliest loneliness, while weaker
individuals have greater chances of failure. But we all have a shot, and the
psychological studies I have cited help us understand how and why we
might be motivated to succeed, which is clearly what Nietzsche wants.
A related worry is that it seems natural to say that our aversive
feelings toward loneliness would move us to abandon the project of
self-transformation, since such a project can itself cause terrible loneliness.
Generating values that are uniquely our own could cause distressful isolation. Returning to “the herd” can ease that distress. Thus, loneliness seems
to have the opposite effect of what I have presented here.
There is no doubt that some individuals could be motivated to avoid
loneliness by rejecting self-transformation and running back to others.
But this does not make the best sense of what we know empirically about
loneliness, especially combined with the affective state of embracing the
eternal recurrence test as Nietzsche imagines it. We are asked to review
our lives from a maximal degree of loneliness. Even nonmaximally, though,
loneliness reveals a separation from others, a distrust of others, and an

204 | J O U R N A L O F N I E T Z S C H E S T U D I E S

incentive to look inward. The maximal state of loneliness, then, especially
if one imagines that state repeating indefinitely, should undermine the
motivation to embrace “the herd.” Moreover, while aversive feelings toward
loneliness might very well manifest themselves during the self-transformation process, undergoing that process should also manifest certain pleasures, in particular pleasures felt when we succeed at grasping values that
express who we most desire to be. These pleasures have clear forward-moving motivational force. For this reason, those who find self-development
pleasurable, such as higher individuals, have a strong chance of beating
out aversive feelings after cursing the demon and embarking on the path
toward self-development. Overall, then, the motivation to overcome our
loneliest loneliness by transforming ourselves should effectively outweigh
aversive feelings that arise during transformation.
One might also be worried that the psychological context of the eternal
recurrence cuts us off not only from the herd, but also from friends who
might empower self-development. Nietzsche’s view of friendship, however,
is not our ordinary conception. He writes, “Our faith in others betrays in
what respect we would like to have faith in ourselves. Our longing for a
friend is our betrayer” (Z I: “On the Friend”). Seeking friendship often
counters self-reliance. But there are important exceptions. For Nietzsche,
genuine friendship should advance mutual self-transformation. Such a
project involves letting friends suffer so that they might become their best
selves. He writes, “If one wants to have a friend one must also want to wage
war for him: and to wage war, one must be capable of being an enemy. [. . .]
Can you go close to your friend without going over to him?” (Z I: “On the
Friend”). To “go over” to a friend is to provide blanket comfort in such a way
that betrays the friend’s ability to develop as an individual. Alternatively,
being an “enemy” while being “close” involves choosing to deny comforts
to friends at particular moments, with the aim of helping them undergo
self-development. “Compassion for the friend,” Nietzsche remarks, “should
conceal itself under a hard shell” (Z I: “On the Friend”). Imagining the eternal recurrence is perhaps the most important moment for friends to withdraw explicit comfort, assuming the test does not already undermine the
grounds of that relationship. Close friends should allow us to grapple with
the terrifying thoughts of recurrence. Nietzsche therefore seems to think
that the transformative power of the eternal recurrence is actually enhanced
when someone is separated from close friends—and it may even be our
friend’s duty to ensure separation during such critical moments.
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Let us return to the issue about the desire to avoid loneliness. There is a
common problem that bedevils our understanding the eternal recurrence
as a practical thought experiment, which my reading solves. The problem is
that Nietzsche’s infamous “last man” might pass the test. The “last man” is
someone who is perfectly self-satisfied—someone who is happy, comfortable, and lazy and sees no need to strive to achieve difficult goals, especially
self-transformation. For these reasons, Nietzsche’s “last man” is often considered the harbinger of nihilism. Unfortunately, it is easy to see the “last
man” dismissing Nietzsche’s demon with a complacent shrug and saying,
“Sure, I would do this again forever. Why not?” It would be devastating for
Nietzsche’s account if the “last man” could easily and genuinely affirm the
eternal recurrence. But launching the test from a state of profound loneliness prevents such a response. The “last man” would not want to entertain
reliving painful isolation again and again indefinitely. The available reactions to such a thought can only be rejection that leads to failure or failure
that invites change. Either way, smug self-satisfaction is unavailable. This
crucial result requires paying close attention to the psychological context
of the test.
Now consider other readings of the psychological setting of GS 341.
Many commentators fail to notice the somber context altogether. But not
all. Maudemarie Clark acknowledges the importance of the phrase “loneliest loneliness.” On her account, our loneliest loneliness “suggests a situation of vulnerability to suggestions one would otherwise dismiss,” and she
identifies such vulnerability with “a situation in which critical powers are at
a minimum.”29 Clark is right about loneliness being a state of vulnerability,
and it does seem that loneliness can reduce our critical powers in the sense
that being vulnerable can block skepticism that might disarm the demon’s
thought and prevent it from being taken seriously. But loneliness does not
minimize our critical awareness across the board. Empirical studies suggest
that certain critical powers, specifically those that reveal various dangers
involved with social life, are actually increased when one feels extremely
lonely. Clark overlooks this positive feature of vulnerability—a feature that
is vital for successfully achieving Nietzschean self-transformation.
Paul Loeb has offered the most extensive recent commentary on the
eternal recurrence, so I would like to say something about his reading.
Loeb views the eternal recurrence as a metaphysical view about the way the
world is, rather than a practical thought experiment, and his interpretive
goal is to explain how Nietzsche thinks we are able to discover the truth
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of eternal recurrence in order to motivate us to change our lives. Loeb is
not trying to explain why Nietzsche thinks a thought experiment about the
eternal recurrence can motivate self-development. Nonetheless, Loeb gives
three different readings of “einsamste Einsamkeit,” and even commentators who reject the metaphysical interpretation of the eternal recurrence
could be tempted to embrace those readings. Though none of what follows
directly challenges Loeb’s work, I want to show, for those of us who prefer the thought-experiment reading, why none of Loeb’s readings can both
motivate and help us succeed at self-development.
I have already mentioned Loeb’s first interpretation. He argues that “einsamste Einsamkeit” should be translated as “most solitary solitude,” primarily
because “solitude” captures what Nietzsche “commends as the best possible
state for maximizing one’s critical powers.”30 I suggested that translating
“Einsamkeit” as “solitude” in GS 341 leads to a significant difficulty: it fails to
explain why self-development is motivated. For Nietzsche, self-transformation is motivated because we are terrified of what it would feel like to embrace
the eternal recurrence from an extreme state of painful isolation—what it
would feel like to endure lasting, profound loneliness, gritting one’s teeth
through feelings like alienation, unimportance, and the like, with no end in
sight. Feeling confident in our critical abilities cannot be said to be nearly so
motivating. Loeb writes that for Nietzsche solitude involves “isolating oneself from the common opinion in order to discover and bring to the surface one’s own deepest instinctive wisdom.”31 But such isolation puts the cart
before the horse. It does not explain how feelings of isolation manifest the
need for self-transformation in the first place. Loeb correctly characterizes
Nietzschean solitude as an intentional state, but loneliness is typically a state
into which we find ourselves helplessly thrown and needing to escape.32
Loeb’s second reading of “einsamste Einsamkeit” falls short for similar
reasons. “The most solitary solitude,” Loeb says, “alludes to the poetic idea
that everyone dies alone.”33 But linking “Einsamkeit” to the idea that everyone
dies alone requires translating “Einsamkeit” as “loneliness” rather than “solitude.” The majority of us—though certainly not all—are scared of dying alone,
not of being critically aware. And, given the right frame of mind, our fear of
death can move us to achieve the best version of ourselves before we are gone.
Again, the motivation to affirm the eternal recurrence relies on loneliness.
Loeb’s final reading occurs in his most recent work. He claims that “the
most solitary of solitudes in which I hear my demon’s revelation alludes
to Nietzsche’s view that my conscious mind is the evolved psychological

Loneliness, Self-Transformation, and the Eternal Recurrence | 207

location for social communication.”34 In intense solitude, Loeb suggests, we
can hear our authentic voice speak to us, though the voice is unconscious.
This interpretation pulls together disparate texts (namely, TI “Socrates”
4; BGE 6; GS 354) that connect the eternal recurrence to outside themes
like representational consciousness and evolutionary psychology. As I see
things, however, the message of GS 341 is clear in that very passage: Nietzsche
believes that coming to grips with the demon’s suggestion in a state of profound loneliness will be transformative. Loeb’s account also implies that
when we hear the demon we cannot consciously understand the need to
undergo self-development. But GS 341 says nothing to this effect. In fact, the
passage suggests the opposite. The task of becoming “well disposed” to ourselves and to life, such that we “long for nothing more fervently” than eternal
recurrence, certainly appears to be a conscious affirmation. Nietzsche does
think unconscious motives play a significant role in steering our lives, but
an adequate response to the eternal recurrence is a reflective choice.35
With objections and alternative readings dispatched, let me conclude.
I have attempted to explain the importance of the psychological context
of GS 341 if we take the eternal recurrence to be a practical thought experiment meant to transform our lives. Hearing the demon in our loneliest
loneliness not only encourages Nietzschean self-transformation, but also
helps us succeed in this project, and empirical research can be marshalled
to support this conclusion. The specific psychological context of GS 341 is
therefore essential for understanding why and how the eternal recurrence
is supposed to enable self-development.
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